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1 need to see a general practitioner (GP) because of a health problem, they 
initially have to choose which GP they want to visit. Because the relationships between 
patients and doctors usually are long term, the initial choice of a GP may be important to 
people. From the medical literature
2 we know that factors of importance to this choice are 
practice characteristics like physical accessibility and waiting time for an appointment, as well 
as attributes of the doctor, such as age and gender. We also know that aspects of the doctor-
patient relationship are the most important determinants of satisfaction among patients. 
Earlier analysis in this field are stated preference studies based on questions regarding 
hypothetical GPs or questions about the GP an individual has already chosen (see for instance 
Vick and Scott 1998, Scott and Vick 1999 and Veale et al. 1995). From these analyses we 
obtain an impression of what individuals mean by a “perfect” GP or what ideal characteristics 
the “perfect” GP should have.  None of the studies are based on individuals’ actual choice of 
GPs and hence they do not take account of individuals’ opportunities in the decision process.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to gain more knowledge concerning individuals’ preferences for 
alternative GPs within a municipality. We have data on the population’s first, second and 
third choice of GPs. The data stem from the entry form the inhabitant filled in as a result of 
the implementation of a list patient system in general practice in Norway. To assess the 
potential demand for GPs
3 or individuals’ request for a position on a certain GP’s list, we 
formulate and estimate a structural demand model based on probabilistic theories of 
                                                 
1 Individuals, inhabitants, persons, and patients are used synonymously throughout the paper. 
2 A short review of this literature can be found in Scott (2000). 
3 Dagsvik et.al. (2001) inspired us to model the individual’s choice of a GP with this kind of model. 
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individual choice behaviour. The model originates from the work of Luce (see for instance 
Luce, 1959 and Block and Marschak, 1960). Such models are successfully used to obtain 
knowledge of people’s preferences for different transportation vehicles.  
 
We raise the question of whether individuals’ choice of GPs is informed or purely random, as 
well as the question of whether observable demographic characteristics of a GP can tell us 
anything about the person who wants him or her as a personal physician. We find systematic 
dependencies between characteristics of an individual and characteristics of his or her choice 
of a GP. But we also find that the random part plays a major role in the choice process. In the 
last part of the paper we discuss policy implications of our findings. Central points are both 
how local health authorities can use the information on rankings to put together collegiums of 
GPs that serve the need – or the demand – of the inhabitants in the best way, and how a 




Neoclassical economists view individuals’ choice as deterministic, i.e. individuals are able to 
rank alternatives in a consistent and unambiguous manner and they choose the alternative that 
is ranked first. In contrast to this approach, psychologists interpret individuals’ choice as the 
outcome of a probabilistic process. This is in part caused by observed inconsistencies in 
human behaviour. One explanation for the inconsistencies is that such behaviour reflects 
fluctuations that are inherent in the process of evaluating alternatives (p. 13 in Anderson, de 
Palma and Thisse 1992).  
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One class of models of probabilistic choice are the models of discrete or quantal choice, of 
which the logit model is one type. The logit model is a useful tool to analyse whether an 
individual’s choice of a GP is made at random or based on known characteristics of the GPs 
in the area. This can be explored by displaying some of the properties of this model (see for 




(1)        () () () nm nm nm Ui Vi i ε =+  
 
be individual n’s utility of choosing GP i in municipality m. Here,  ( ) nm Vi is the deterministic 
part of the utility function and ( ) nm i ε is the stochastic part that takes account of unobservable 
factors influencing the individual’s choice. The random term may capture aspects that are 
random to the individual, and also effects of variables that are perfectly known to the 
individual but unobserved by the analyst, for instance the GP’s personality and the 
relationship between the GP and his patients. Because individuals choose GPs within their 
resident municipality the feasible alternatives differ between municipalities.  nm C  is the 
feasible choice set facing individual n in municipality m. n = 1, 2, …,N1, N1+1, … N2, …, 
N5+1, N6. i = 1, 2, …,I1, I1+1, … I2, …, I5+1, I6. m = 1, 2, …6. The indexing means that the 
inhabitants (GPs) in municipality m = 1 are the individuals n = 1,2,…,N1 ( i = 1,2,…,I1). 
Similarly, inhabitants (GPs) in municipality m = 6 are the individuals n = N5+1,…,N6 (i = 
I5+1,…,I6). 
 
We assume that the individuals in the population are statistically identical and independent. 
Let ( ) nm Pi be the probability that individual n chooses alternative i from a sample of size I6. If   5
() nm i ε  follows an extreme value
 distribution ( ) exp( ) ()
x
nm Pxe i σ ε
−
≤= −  , where σ is a positive 
constant, the resulting choice probabilities are given by (Luce 1959):  
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As can be seen, the choice probabilities are constructed from the principle of maximization of 
individual utilities.  
 
When σ→∞  the variance of  ( ) nm i ε  tends to infinity. It then follows that the deterministic part 
of the utility  ( ) nm Vi is totally dominated by the stochastic term ( ) nm i ε . In this case the model 
contains no information, and has no predictive power. All the alternatives then become 
equally probable and the choice of GP is made on a purely random basis, i.e. the preferences 
are extremely uncertain.  
 
When σ→0, the variance of  () nm i ε  tends to zero. In this case all the information about 
preferences is contained in the deterministic part of the utility function, () nm Vi and the 
characteristics of the different alternatives are perfectly known. Hence, there is no uncertainty 
in the preferences and the model is reduced to a neoclassical deterministic model.  
 
We assume that individuals’ preferences are independent of each other. Let  (, , ) nm Pi j k be the 
probability that an individual n living in municipality m shall rank GP i on top, j second best 
and k third best. 
   6
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Equation (4) is the product of three logit models. The three numerators of the expression are 
related to respectively individual n’s first, second, and third GP choice. The denominator 
reflects the different choice sets in the three steps of the ranking. In the first step all GPs in the 
individual’s choice set are included, in the second step the first choice is removed from the 
choice set and in the third step the first and the second choice are removed from the choice 
set.  
 
The likelihood function is given by: 
 




LP i j k =∏  
 
where Yijkn = 1 if individual n ranks alternative i on top, j second best and k third best, and 0 
otherwise. Let  L* be the estimated likelihood and L0 the likelihood when all choices are 
purely random. As a measure of the goodness of fit we can therefore employ
5:  
 
                                                 
4 The model is a Luce model for ranking. The development of this model started with Luce (1959). In Beggs et 
al. (1980) an application of this model can be found. 
5 This measure is closely related to McFaddens 
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− −− −− ∑ .  
1 () mm NN − − are the number of observations (individuals) in municipality m, and 
1 () mm II − − are the number of GPs in the choice set in municipality m.  
 
When 
2 ρ =1 (σ=0), the covariates explain all the variation in the data, i.e. there is no 
uncertainty in the preferences. In the other extreme, (
2 ρ = 0 ) , the deterministic part of the 
model has no predictive power. This information will be used in the empirical testing of how 
well the model fits the data. 
 
 
3. Data and hypotheses
6 
Our data stem from the implementation of the list patient organization of general practice in 
Norway
7. The whole sample constitutes 59119 inhabitants in 12 municipalities. The 
municipalities are representatively chosen according to centrality
8 (Sundvoll and Kvalstad  
2002). The inhabitants are free to choose among all the GPs practising in their resident 
municipality. On an entry form everybody was asked to fill in their ranking of GPs. Hence we 
                                                 
6 The data used in the analysis are taken from Statistics Norway (SSB) and The National Insurance 
Administration (RTV). NSD have prepared the data for analytical purposes. Neither RTV, SSB nor NSD are 
responsible for the empirical analysis or the interpretations of the findings in the paper. 
7 When the inhabitants needed a doctor before the new organization was implemented, they were free to choose 
among all GPs in the municipality. The reform implies that every inhabitant in the municipality is given a 
personal GP, and that every GP is given a distinct list of patients to serve. 
8 Statistics Norway classifies Norwegian municipalities according to centrality. The measure captures the size of 
the population, population density and the distance to the nearest city of a certain size. The most central 
municipalities are given the value 7 in this index, the least central is given value 1.   8
know an individual’s first, second and third most preferred GP. Characteristics of inhabitants 
and GPs are known to us. We know age and gender of the inhabitants and we know age, 
gender, stated list size of the GPs and also whether he or she is a specialist in general practice. 
It’s important to note that the characteristics of the GPs were not explicitly given to the 
inhabitants on the entry form. Even if individuals do not have exact information on these 
variables, we assume that they have some idea of them. This is in itself an interesting point: 
do the inhabitants collect this kind of information before they rank the GPs or do they simply 
make random choices? The following hypotheses are made about the impact of the variables 
on individuals’ choices:  
1.  It is often claimed that GPs “get old with” their patients. We would therefore expect a 
correspondence between the age of the GP and his patients. An age difference variable 
is included to take account of this hypothesis.  
2.  Individuals’ seem to prefer continuity in their relationship to a GP. Older GPs have 
most likely been practicing in the area for a long period and are probably both well 
known in the population and have been personal doctors for many inhabitants before 
the reform. We therefore expect that the older the GP is, the more persons want to be 
listed in his practice. We include a variable for the GP’s age to take account of this 
hypothesis.  
3.  From the literature we know that female doctors have more female patients than male 
doctors. We would therefore expect females to prefer female doctors.   
4.  After medical school medical doctors can continue their education and become a 
specialist. We expect GPs with a speciality in general practice to become a more 
experienced doctor and therefore be more popular than GPs without that speciality. 
The variable speciality accounts for whether a GP has undertaken further education in 
general practice.     9
5.  Before the new organization was implemented each GP was asked to state the number 
of people he would like to have on his list. Since GPs’ preferred workload varies, the 
preferred number of people on the list is likely to vary between GPs. One obvious 
interpretation is that GPs preferring long lists have full-time practices with daily 
access, while GPs preferring shorter lists have part-time practices with poorer access. 
We use stated list size as an indicator of accessibility and we expect individuals to 
prefer GPs with a long list.  
 
In Table 1, the characteristics of the GPs and the potential patients in the sample are reported. 
About 70 % of the individuals in the chosen municipalities filled in the form. Females filled in 
more GP choices than males, and the older the inhabitant is and the longer seniority
9 he or she 
has with the first choice GP, the fewer GPs are filled in on the form. On average, individuals 
who filled in three choices have about ½ year shorter seniority with his or her first choice GP 
than the rest of the sample. The inhabitants who refused to fill in any GP choices are younger 
than the average and a majority of them are men. From the literature we know that young men 
use doctors less frequently than the average population. It therefore seems likely that those in 
the sample who did not fill in the form have less experience with GPs and also a lesser need 
for a GP than the rest of the population.  
 
From an analysis of the organization of general practice in Norway, Finnvold (1997) found 
that in some municipalities the turnover among GPs is quite high. In brief he states that GPs 
in these municipalities are changing patients and not vice versa
10. As a measure of high turn-
over or instability among GPs he used the share of GPs in the municipality who are paid a 
                                                 
9 On the form the individuals were asked to report the number of years before the list patient system was 
implemented they had used their first choice GP as a personal doctor.  
10 The normal situation would be that inhabitants change doctors because they are dissatisfied with their previous 
doctor.   10
fixed salary
11 and the share of GPs who are interns
12. As a measure of stability he uses the 
share of GPs who are privately practising. It follows that a municipality with a high degree of 
stability has a lower share of GPs on a fixed salary, a lower share of interns and a higher share 
of privately practising GPs than the average. These municipalities are usually centrally 
located municipalities. We would expect that individuals living in municipalities with a high 
turnover to a lesser extent know the GPs practising in the area and hence that they to a lesser 
extent than others have bothered filling in the form. Table 2 shows that these hypotheses find 
support in the data: the higher the degree of turnover the fewer GP choices are filled in. Those 
who refused to fill in any GP choices live in the municipalities with the highest turnover of 
GPs. On average, individuals who filled in three choices live in municipalities with more GPs 
practising and also more female doctors, i.e. their choice set is larger than for the rest of the 
sample. Average list size is often used as an indicator of an individual’s accessibility to 
general practice. It is interesting to note that individuals who made three choices live in areas 
where GPs have a longer average list size (lower GP density) than in the rest of the sample. 
This points to an important distinction, namely that if there are few GPs to choose among - 
and at the extreme, no one you prefer - it does not help if the accessibility to the available GPs 
is good.  It then seems that important explanations of whether an individual fills in the form as 
well as how many choices he or she made are influenced by the organization of general 






                                                 
11 In the old system GPs were either municipal employees on a fixed salary or they were privately practising paid 
partly by fee for service. The fixed salary positions were the least popular, among other things because the 
expected income was lower.   
12 In Norway, medical doctors have to practice one year as interns before they are authorized. Half of this period 
they have to work in general practice. Because rural municipalities historically have had problems in finding 
enough GPs, interns are more frequently used as GPs in these areas than in more urban areas. It follows that 
municipalities with interns working in general practice get new doctors every ½ year.   11
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13 Inhabitants are free to choose not to participate in the list patient system.  
14 This measure is only reported for inhabitants who filled in their first GP choice.   12
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n  59119  10289 11605 18915  17999  311 
 
The empirical analysis consists of inhabitants who made three GP choices; this constitutes 
about 17 % of the whole sample. Individuals in this sub-sample live in the most central 
municipalities with the highest degree of stability among GPs, a GPs’ average list size is 
longer in these municipalities and the absolute number of GPs to choose among is higher. A 
larger proportion of the GPs are females. A majority of the inhabitants who filled in three 
                                                 
15 A municipality’s GP density is the inverse of average list size in the municipality. It is calculated by dividing  
the total number of GPs by 10000 inhabitants. The calculation does not take account of how much each GP 
works and as such it may be biased.  
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choices are females and they are younger than the rest of the sample. The chosen GPs are 
about ½ year older, want 10 fewer persons on the list and more of them are females than in 
the whole sample.  In other words, individuals in this sub-sample have more options when 
they make their choices than the average population. To a lesser extent than the rest of the 
sample they experience supply-side limitations in the process of choosing a GP. One 
advantage of using this sub-sample is that we can focus on people’s choices and not their 




4. Estimation and results 




12 3 45 () () () ( () ) () () () nm n n Vi i A i A A i G i S i L i ββ β ββ == + − ++ + nm Z β   
 
where ( ) i nm Z is a vector consisting of the attributes of GP i  relative to individual number  n in 
municipality m . From the description of the data and the hypothesis in section 3, it follows 
that the attributes  ( ) i nm Z  are both related to the GP and to the individual. Here, A(i) is the age 
of the GP and An the age of the individual, Gn(i) is a dummy which equals one if the GP and 
the individual are of the same gender, zero otherwise, S(i) is a dummy which equals one if the 
GP has a speciality in general practice,  and is zero otherwise, and L(i) is the number of 
persons the GP would like to have on his list (list size). β is a vector of unknown parameters. 
Because σ  cannot be identified, it is no loss of generality to assume σ  to equal one and 
absorb it in theβ- coefficient.  
   14
Because the number of individuals who filled in three GP choices is quite small in 
municipalities where the number of GPs is less than or equal to three, we decided to omit the 
five smallest municipalities from the analysis. We also left out one municipality with five GPs 
practising because all the GPs were men. Our net sample now constitutes 9361 individuals in 
6 municipalities
16. In the largest municipality, 12 GPs are practising while there are 4 in the 
smallest. In the programming and empirical analysis the software program TSP (TSP 4.5) is 
used. All parameters are sharply estimated and with the expected sign. The results show 
(Table 3):  
1.  The smaller the age difference between a GP and an individual is, the higher is the 
probability of choosing that GP. 
2.  The probability of choosing a GP is higher the older the GP is. 
3.  If a GP and an individual are of the same gender, the probability of choosing the GP 
increases.   
4.  A GP with a long stated list size has a higher probability of being chosen than GPs 
with shorter lists. This tendency is rather weak in magnitude. 
5.  If the GP is a specialist in general practice, the probability of being chosen increases. 
  
The goodness of fit is measured by (7). We calculate 
2 ρ  to be 0.19, which means that the 
model explains the data 19 % better than if individuals are assumed to make purely random 
choices. Hence, there are systematic dependencies between characteristics of an individual 
and characteristics of his or her choice of GP, but the random part of the model also plays a 
major role in the choice process.  
 
                                                 
16 Compared to the whole sample of those who made three choices it follows that the chosen sub-sample is 
located in municipalities with more GPs practising and also more female doctors (see tables A1 and A2 in 
appendix). The turnover of GPs, the centrality of the municipalities and the composition of the population 
according to age and gender are at about the same level.   15
Table 3: Results of the empirical analysis. 
 
Variable Estimate  Standard  error  t-statistics 
Age difference  - 0.0002  0.0001  - 14.7309 
Age    0.0036  0.0005      7.2444 
Gender, dummy    0.5743  0.1114    50.5257 
List size    0.0005  0.0001      3.8680 
Speciality    0.2752  0.0137    20.1228 
Number of observations = 9361 
Log likelihood = - 45188.8,  logL
0 = 55617,  Schwarz B.I.C. = 45211.7, 
2 ρ = 0.19 
 
When we use the sub-sample where individuals filled in only one GP choice in the analysis, 
the results are similar (Table 4). In this sub-sample two additional municipalities are included, 
and in both municipalities three GPs are practising. The total number of observations in this 
analysis is 15556. 
 
Table 4: Results of the empirical analysis based on the results on the sub- sample where 
individuals made one choice.  
 
Variable Estimate  Standard  error  t-statistics 
Age difference  -0.0005 0.0000  -18.1016 
Age   0.0242  0.0011   21.4968 
Gender, dummy   0.7319  0.0268   27.2860 
List size   0.0019  0.0003   60.4511 
Speciality   0.7528  0.0263   28.6329 
Number of observations = 15556. 
Log likelihood = - 26808.4, logL
0 = 31412.5, Schwarz B.I.C. = 26832.5, 
2 ρ = 0.15. 
 
 
It may seem strange that both age and age difference are included in the analysis. We 
therefore carried out the analysis without the age variable (Table 5). As can be seen, the effect 
of the variables corresponds to those reported in Table 3, but 
2 ρ is slightly smaller.  
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Table 5: Results of the empirical analysis when we omit the age variable.  
 
Variable Estimate  Standard  error  t-statistics 
Age difference  - 0.0002  0.0000  - 12.1047 
Gender, dummy   0.5298  0.1126   47.0654 
List size   0.0008  0.0000   10.7868 
Speciality   0.3279  0.0105   31.2623 
Number of observations =  9361. 
Log likelihood = - 45732.6, logL
0 = 55617, Schwarz B.I.C. = 45750.9, 
2 ρ = 0.18 
 
 
From the analysis in Table 3, we find that the probability that an individual with certain 
characteristics will rank GP i on top, GP j second and GP k third. To illustrate our findings we 
can present an example of a municipality with three GPs practising. GP A is a 45 year-old 
female doctor who is a specialist in general practice. Her stated list size is 1500. The two 
other GPs are men. GP B is 50 years old, he is a specialist in general practice and his stated 
list size is 1700. GP C is 35 years old and his stated list size is 1800. GP C is not a specialist 
in general practice. In Table 6 we have calculated the probability of three different individuals 
making different rankings of the three GPs. We see three interesting patterns: 
1.  All three inhabitants have a higher probability of choosing one of the rankings than the 
others; the 50 year-old woman has the highest probability of choosing A first, B 
second and C third, while the 35 year-old man as well as the 75 year-old man prefer 
the rank ordering B, C, A.  
2.  All three inhabitants have a very small probability of choosing one of the GPs on top; 
the female does not prefer GP C on top, while the two men do not prefer the female 
GP. 
3.  The inhabitants seem to be indifferent between some of the rankings. For instance, the 
female inhabitant is indifferent between choosing A, C, B and B, A, C and the 75 
year-old man is indifferent between B, A, C and C, B, A.   17
It is also interesting to note that even though the youngest male inhabitant is of the same age 
as GP C he prefers a rank ordering with the oldest GP first. One explanation might be that the 
oldest GP has a speciality in general practice, while the youngest does not.  
 










order   
A, B, C 
Prob. of 
rank 
order   
A, C, B 
Prob. of 
rank 
order   
B, C, A 
Prob. of 
rank 
order   
B, A, C 
Prob. of 
rank 
order   
C, B, A 
Prob. of 
rank 
order   
C, A, B 
Female 50 
years old 
0,277 0,199 0,096 0,209 0,085 0,134 
Male 35 
years old 
0,125 0,099 0,262 0,172 0,226 0,116 
Male 75 
years old 
0,140 0,087 0,270 0,207 0,200 0,095 
 
GP A: Female, 45 years old, stated list size 1500, specialist in general practice. 
GP B: Male, 50 years old, stated list size 1700, specialist in general practice. 




5. Discussion  
 
We find that the model does not explain all the variation in the data and that the random part 
plays a major role in the choice process. This component might capture both omitted variables 
and other sources of uncertainty
18. The data used in the analysis stem from the very first 
dataset made available. At this stage, four characteristics of the GPs and two of the inhabitants 
are available to us. The random component may therefore capture omitted variables. In the 
future more information on the GPs from national registries will be available. We will 
                                                 
17 A similar calculation is made on the basis of the analysis of individuals who made one choice on the entry 
form (see Table A3 in Appendix). We find that individuals in this sample have stronger preferences for one or 
two rank ordering than was the case for individuals who filled in three choices. This result corresponds to our 
hypothesis when we described the whole sample. 
18 A discussion of the different sources of uncertainty can be found in Manski (1977).    18
probably have data on whether they are of Norwegian
19 origin, whether they were paid a fixed 
salary in the former system and the number of services they provide to the average individual 
on the list (service intensity)
20. We would expect that if these variables were included in the 
analysis, the model would explain a larger portion of the data.   
 
It seems that a GP’s personality and how individuals perceive the doctor’s medical 
qualifications are the most important factors underlying the random component. Based on 
hypothetical scenarios describing GP visits, Scott and Vick (1999) and Vick and Scott 
(1998)
21 found that the most important attribute of the doctor-patient relationship is “being 
able to talk to the doctor”, followed by patients’ understanding of “doctors’ explanation of 
information”. This information may typically be observed for potential patients either by 
reputation in the municipality or by the individual’s own experience with that doctor. Because 
individuals’ personality and experience vary, the way individuals perceive a certain GP will 
vary and therefore a general characterization of a certain GP’s personality will most likely not 
make sense. Even if we could agree on a personality variable, this kind of information would 
not be available through national registries.  Analysing doctor-patient relationships therefore 
requires other analytical methods than the stochastic ranking model used in this paper.  
 
Because we believe doctor-patient relationships to be very important in the process of 
individuals’ ranking of GPs, we plan to analyse the importance of them based on Statistics 
Norway’s questionnaire survey of a representative sample of the Norwegian population.  In 
this survey 6000 individuals have answered several questions about the implementation of the 
                                                 
19 In recent years there has been a general scarcity of medical doctors in Norway. A consequence of this situation 
is that many foreign doctors are working in general practice. Frequently it is reported that medical doctors from 
other countries cause linguistic and cultural problems for their patients. We therefore expect that people prefer to 
be listed by Norwegian doctors. 
20 In the literature it is often discussed whether the practice style between these two groups differ, and it is, for 
example, claimed that GPs with a fixed salary offer their patients longer consultations. 
21 See also Grogan et al. (1995).   19
list patient system. They are, for instance, asked to give their most important of three stated 
reasons why they rank their first choice doctor first. The three possibilities capture physical 
accessibility, the GP’s medical qualifications and continuity in the relationship to a GP. The 
respondent is also asked to answer five statements regarding GPs
22. The statements capture 
aspects like medical confidence and waiting time to obtain a consultation.  We believe that 
results from this analysis will further contribute to the understanding of why individuals’ 
preferences for GPs differ, and hence be an interesting supplement to this paper. 
 
Our initial hypothesis was that individuals would attach importance to physical accessibility 
to the GP’s office when they choose a GP. For instance, we thought that individuals would 
prefer to be listed by a GP with an office close to where they live and also that they prefer a 
GP office made accessible to the disabled. From the data we found that all the included GP 
offices were adapted to accommodate the disabled, and therefore it did not make sense to 
include this variable in the analysis. To account for the individual’s residential address 
relative to the GP’s practice address, we tried to include a dummy variable taking the value 
one if a GP’s office and an individual’s home address had the same postal code and zero 
otherwise. Since the extent of an area covered by a postal code varies, it may be the case that 
a geographical area of a certain size has ten different postal codes while another area of the 
same size has only one. Hence, this variable did not make any sense in the analysis. Instead, 
the meaning of accessibility will be analysed on the basis of the questionnaire survey 
mentioned above. 
 
We use stated list size as an indicator of access to the GP and we found that individuals prefer 
GPs with long preferred lists to GPs with shorter preferred lists. However, this effect may also 
                                                 
22 The answering categories range from totally agree to totally disagree (five categories).   20
be interpreted as an effect of individuals preferring continuity in the relationship to their GP. 
This may occur because GPs who stated a long preferred list size most likely also had a long 
list and many patients to care for ahead of the reform. The effect may therefore capture the 
possibilities that individuals choose the GP they are used to, i.e. that they prefer continuity in 
the doctor-patient relationship. The fact that we found older GPs to be more popular than 
younger GPs, can also be interpreted as individuals’ preferences for continuity in the 
relationship to a GP. It therefore seems important that the health authorities aim at achieving 
stability among GPs. The importance of stability among GPs is also reflected in the way the 
population filled in the entry form. We found that the higher turnover there was among GPs, 
the lower was the share of the population that filled in three choices on the form; i.e. they may 
not have bothered to fill in the form because the possibility of getting the GP they prefer is 
rather small. It follows that the population faces very different choice sets when choosing GPs 
in a country like Norway with small municipalities and rural districts.  
 
To allocate GPs to all inhabitants of Norway, the health authorities made a GP distribution 
algorithm. The main factors in the algorithm that determines the actual matching between 
individuals and GPs are the individuals’ seniority with their first choice GP and the distance 
from their home address to the GP’s office. Because we know the GP each inhabitant is  
actually assigned due to the algorithm, an idea for further work is to compare individuals’ 
preferred ranking from our model to the actual outcome. An interesting question is whether 
the distribution algorithm takes account of the findings regarding individuals’ preferences in 
this paper. 
 
   21
6. Conclusion 
 
To obtain more knowledge about the characteristics different individuals emphasize when 
choosing a GP, we have estimated a stochastic model for ranking.  As far as we know, such 
ranking models have not previously been used in the health economic literature. From the 
model we analyse whether the systematic or the random part of the utility function dominates 
in explaining how people choose a doctor. All the estimated parameters are sharply estimated 
and have the expected sign. Hence, we found systematic features that influence the 
population’s choice of GPs, i.e. people’s choices of GPs are not purely random. 
 
82.9 % of the inhabitants in our data set were allocated their first choice GP as a personal 
doctor, and only 11.2 % did not get any of their GP choices fulfilled. It then seems that the 
actual composition of the GPs’ lists follow from individuals’ preferences
23. We found that 
female doctors have more females and older GPs have more elderly on their lists. In the 
literature (see for instance Carr Hill et al. 1996 or Windmeijer and Santos Silva 1997) it is 
often claimed that the elderly and females are more frequent users of medical doctors than the 
average person. It then follows that some GPs may have a heavier patient load than the 
average. In the negotiations on the remuneration system for GPs this was an important 
concern of the Norwegian Medical Association. They argued that GPs should not suffer an 
economic loss because they treat patients with a considerable need for health services. The 
fee-for-service component therefore constitutes 70 % and the per capita component 30 % of 
an average GP’s income and this composition is intended to take account of differences in 
patient load. This implies that GPs with a long list of healthy individuals and GPs with a 
shorter list of people with a greater need for health care face the same income possibilities. An 
                                                 
23 Norwegian GPs are not allowed to refuse patients who want to be listed in his or her practice, i.e. no cream-
skimming occurs.   22
alternative way to compensate GPs with a heavy patient load is to differentiate the per capita 
component, i.e. pay a larger sum per capita if the person on the list is female or elderly
24. 
 
We found that inhabitants in a municipality make very different rankings of GPs. The analysis 
shows that women prefer female doctors while men prefer males. It also seems that 
individuals prefer that the age difference between themselves and the doctor should be as 
small as possible. One policy implication of these findings is that the collegiums of GPs in a 
municipality should reflect the age and gender composition of the population. Because it 
seems that individuals prefer continuity in their relationship to a GP, it also seems important 
that the health authorities aim at achieving stability among GPs. 
 
 
                                                 
24 Discussions of the advantages and disadvantages of different systems of remunerating GPs can be found in 
Maynard et al. (1986) and in Donaldson and Gerard (1989). In Scott and Hall (1995) a review of the literature 
regarding the effect of different payment systems for GPs can be found.   23
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Appendix: 
 
Table A1:  
Variable  Filled in three GP choices  Sample used 
Patient gender  0.47 (0.50)  0.47 (0.50) 
Patient age  45.30 (17.05)  45.02 (16.98) 
Years of seniority with 1
st 
choice GP 
7.06 (8.46)  7.34 (8.6) 
Stated list size 1
st choice GP  1227.07 (281.65)  1268.63 (255.96) 
Actual list size 1
st choice GP  1277.18 (330.40)  1319.75 (309.66) 
Gender 1
st choice GP  0.79 (0.41)  0.77 (0.42) 
Age 1
st choice GP  47.89 (9.38)  47.94 (9.04) 
Specialist  0.63 (0.48)  0.65 (0.48) 
n  10289 9361 
 
 
Table A2:  
Variable  Filled in three GP 
choices 
Sample used 
Number of GPs in the 
municipality 
7.44 (3.06)  7.68 (3.10) 
Number of female GPs in the 
municipality 
1.13 (0.86)  1.24 (0.82) 
GP density in the municipality  1465.90 (530.39)  1490.34 (549.82) 
Index of centrality for the 
municipality 
5.52 (1.82)  5.48 (1.89) 
Share interns in the 
municipality 
0.05 (0.07)  0.06 (0.07) 
Share GPs on fixed salary in the 
municipality 
0.12 (0.13)  0.10 (0.13) 
Share privately practising GPs 
in the municipality 
0.80 (0.12)  0.81 (0.12) 
n  10289 9361 
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Table A3: Example of how different individuals make different choices in a municipality with 





























C, A, B 
Female 50 
years old 
0.381 0.104 0.075 0.330 0.050 0.060 
Male 35 
years old 
0.110 0.074 0.313 0.175 0.238 0.089 
Male 75 
years old 
0.129 0.008 0.216 0.598 0.042 0.007 
 
GP A: Female, 45 years old, stated list size 1500, specialist in general practice. 
GP B: Male, 50 years old, stated list size 1700, specialist in general practice. 
GP C: Male, 35 years old, stated list size 1800, not a specialist in general practice. 
 
 